Officially, Qatar is a constitutional monarchy. 
The head of state is the Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, whose position is hereditary. Politically, Qatar is evolving from a traditional society into one based on more formal and democratic institutions to meet the requirements of social and economic progress. The country’s Constitution formulates the hereditary rule of the Thani family, but also provides for an elected legislative body and makes government ministers accountable to the legislature. In current practice, the Emir’s role is influenced by continuing traditions of consultation, rule by consensus, and the citizen’s right to appeal in person to the Emir. The Emir, while directly accountable to no one, cannot violate the Sharia (Islamic law) and, in practice, must consider the opinions of leading families and the religious establishment.

The Constitution was approved by popular vote in 2003, and came into force in June 2005. The Executive is formed by the Council of Ministers, the Legislative by the Advisory Council (currently appointed pending elections). The government is fully centralized. The Qatari Constitution is not groundbreaking in the Arab world, or in the Gulf. Its provisions concerning the role of the state and the limited powers of the legislature are equal to those found in the constitutions of Kuwait and Bahrain. From the standpoint of civil and political rights, the Qatari charter is weak: its right of assembly is qualified, and like Kuwait and Bahrain’s constitutions, it does not permit the formation of political parties. Many other Arab constitutions are more generous in bestowing such. Like neighbouring Gulf constitutions, the Qatari document is silent on the issue of the rights of migrant workers. The Emir appoints the cabinet, has the power to block any legislation, and can implement laws by decree. The Qatari Constitution does not address the central problems of Arab political systems, whether monarchies or republics: the lack of constraints on executive power.

The Emirate of Qatar is usually referred to as an ‘oil monarchy’. This designation, which is commonly applied to all southern Gulf States, implies absolute personal rule based on the distribution of oil wealth. This definition seems exceptionally justified in the case of Qatar. The power of its ruler, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, remains unchecked by effective constitutional control. The Emir – Arabic for ‘one who is in charge’ – appoints the cabinet and his own advisory council, the Majlis al-Shura. The only state institution whose members are periodically elected by the citizens, the Central Municipal Council, has a merely consultative role.

Oil wealth has been an important source of political power in Qatar since the early 1950s. The ruling sheikhs have invariably used a substantial part of the oil revenues to buy off their political rivals and cement or fortify their power base. Because of this political dimension of the oil wealth, Qatar’s rulers have never been particularly inclined to make a distinction between personal and state funds. It was only under British pressure that Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani agreed to a formal distinction between the two in 1950. Although in 1997 the present Emir announced the drafting of legislation which would effectively separate the Treasury from the ruler’s personal funds, this law has never materialized.

However, in day-to-day business some substantial checks on the political power of the Emir do exist. Most important of all, his pre-eminent position has traditionally been challenged within the ruling family itself. Throughout the Al Thani dynasty’s existence, successions have been problematic. Already in the 1870s Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani founded a family tradition when he ousted his father Mohammed – presenting himself as the sole ruler who was acknowledged by the ruling Ottoman empire. When Jassim died in 1913 and was succeeded by his son Abdullah, this transfer of power was vehemently disputed by the sons of Jassim’s brother Ahmad, who was murdered under mysterious circumstances. When Abdullah abdicated in favour of his son Ali in 1949, a smooth succession could be secured only through British intervention. Ali’s successors Ahmad and Khalifa lacked Western protection. Both were deposed by family members, in 1972 and 1995 respectively. Smooth transition of power occurred in June 2013, when Emir Hamad bin Khalifa, at the time 61, announced he would hand over power to his son Tamim.

The rulers of Qatar have always had to reckon with their kin when formulating and executing policy. Among the Gulf’s ruling houses, internal Thani family strife is considered legendary. Several factors contribute to this typical feature of Qatar’s domestic political scene. One is the relative magnitude of the Thani family, which is one of the largest ruling families in the Arab world, and by far the most extensive in comparison to the national population. According to the highest estimates, almost half of Qatar’s citizen population is somehow related to ‘the Family’. There are considered to be about 5,000 adult male Al Thanis at present. This huge family has always been divided among substantial clans and alliances, competing with each other for influence and material benefits.

It is significant that no system of primogeniture has developed in Qatar. This cannot, however, be ascribed merely to the specific nature of ‘the Family’. Probably more important is the fact that dynastic power in Qatar has only very recently been institutionalized. When Qatar became an independent country in 1971, it lacked the established pattern of authority and succession of some of the older ‘monarchies’ of the region. In Kuwait, for example, a succession tradition was already established in the 18th century. Article 9 of the Qatari Constitution of 2005 merely states that the Emir appoints the heir apparent from among his own sons, after consulting the ruling family and ‘the people of wisdom in the State’.

Although the present Constitution formally provides for an independent Judiciary, the Emir still appoints all judges, based on the recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Council, for renewable three-year terms. Approximately 25 percent of these judges are foreign nationals. They are therefore dependent on residence permits granted by the civilian authorities. In 2002, the political scientist Nathan Brown wrote that judges who issued ‘unpopular’ rulings were liable to find their contracts terminated and their visas revoked. Moreover, Qatar’s judicial system was quite unique in that no form of constitutional review existed. However, the new Constitutional Court, created in 2007 alongside an Administrative Court, might theoretically shelter individuals against the all-invading power of the state apparatus.

The legal system of Qatar is based on Islamic and civil law codes. There is a discretionary system of law controlled by the Emir, although civil codes are being implemented. Islamic law dominates family and personal matters. The judicial branch includes Courts of First Instance, of Appeal, and of Cassation.

Qatar is divided into seven municipalities or baladiyat, sometimes called governorates of provinces. These are, in order of population density: al-Dawha (or Doha), al-Rayyan, al-Khor, al-Wakra, Umm Salal, al-Daayen, and Madinat al-Shamal. The municipalities are subdivided into a total of 87 zones.

When the former Emir came to power in 1995, he announced an ambitious programme of political and economic reform. In this programme three major themes can be discerned: encouragement of the private sector, freedom of expression and democratization. The road the Emir chose, was clearly western-oriented. He soon started to surround himself with other modern minded family members, offering them influential posts. His cousin, the former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamad bin Jassim – considered to be the mastermind of the reform program – is the best known member of this new pro-Western elite. Abdulrahman bin Saud Al Thani, Chief of the Emiri Diwan (the Emir’s Secretariat) and former ambassador to Washington, is another key member.

All reforms are well-publicized. To the outside world, the impression has been created that tiny Qatar blew a wind of change throughout the Gulf. As early as November 1995, five months after the bloodless coup, the Emir announced the country’s first experiment in democracy: the creation of an elected Municipal Council. General elections took place in March 1999. Adding to the sensation of a cultural revolution, Qatari women were allowed to vote and stand for office. The West cheered and applauded, but Qatar’s citizens proved less enthusiastic. Of a registered 40,000 voters only about 22,000 nationals participated in the elections.

In consecutive voting rounds the electorate did not respond massively to the government’s idea of public participation. In 2003, the year Sheikha al-Jufayri was elected as the Council’s first female member, voters’ turn-out was only 38 percent. Qatar’s population may be more motivated to drive to the voting office when the unicameral parliament, already announced by the Emir in 1999, finally materializes. In the popular referendum of 2003 they voted en masse – 93 percent – in favour of the new Constitution. According to this document, two-thirds of the Qatari parliament to be would be elected directly. The Parliament would have the power to legislate, review the state budget, monitor government policy and hold ministers accountable.

A powerful, freely elected parliament would have amounted to a cultural and political revolution – not only in Qatar but in the whole of the Middle East. But the elections, which initially were to take place in 2004, were postponed until 2005, and then until 2007. In the summer of 2013 there was still no sign of a parliament in the make. Former Emir Hamad, before handing over power to his son Tamim, extended the term of the Shura Council to 2016, again postponing elections. Like many other promises laid down in the Constitution, which formally came into effect in 2005, there has been no follow-up on announced intentions. This could mean that the power base of the Emir is not as strong as foreign observers reckoned. It could also mean that the drive behind substantial democratic reforms has since disappeared.

When the former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, he announced an ambitious program of political and economic reform. In this program three major themes can be discerned: encouragement of the private sector, freedom of expression, and democratization. The road the Emir chose was clearly Western oriented. He soon started to surround himself with other modern minded members of the family, giving them influential posts. His cousin, the former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamad bin Jassim – considered to be the mastermind of the reform program – is the most well known member of this new pro-Western elite. Abdulrahman bin Saud Al Thani, head of the Emiri Diwan (the Emir’s Secretariat) and a former ambassador to Washington, is another key member.

All reforms are well publicized. To the outside world, the impression has been created that tiny Qatar has blown a wind of change throughout the Gulf. As early as November 1995, five months after the bloodless coup, the Emir announced the country’s first experiment in democracy: the creation of an elected Municipal Council. General elections took place in March 1999. Adding to the sensation of a cultural revolution, Qatari women were allowed to vote and stand for office.

Qatar’s citizens did not prove enthusiastic about these changes. Of the registered 40,000 voters only about 22,000 nationals participated in the elections. In consecutive voting rounds the electorate did not warm to the government’s ideal of public participation. In 2003, the year Sheikha al-Jufayri was elected as the Council’s first female member, voter turn-out was only 38 percent.

Qatar’s population may be more motivated to drive to the voting office when the unicameral Parliament, already announced by the Emir in 1999, finally materializes. In the popular referendum of 2003 they voted en masse – 93 percent – in favour of the new Constitution. According to this document, two-thirds of the Qatari Parliament-to-be would be elected directly. The Parliament would have the power to legislate, review the state budget, monitor government policy, and hold ministers accountable.

A powerful, freely elected Parliament would amount to a cultural and political revolution – not only in Qatar but in the whole of the Middle East. But the elections, which initially were to take place in 2004, were postponed until 2005, and then until 2007. In the summer of 2013 there was still no sign of a parliament in the making. Former Emir Hamad, before handing over power to his son Tamim, extended the term of the Shura Council to 2016, again postponing elections. Like other promises laid down in the Constitution, which formally came into effect in 2005, there has been no follow-up on announced intentions. It could mean that the drive behind substantial democratic reforms has since disappeared.